This book, the third of three volumes, completes the sweeping survey of the effect of computers on American industry began in the first volume and continued in the second volume. It turns finally to the public sector, examining how computers have fundamentally changed the nature of work in government and education. This book goes far beyond generalizations about the Information Age to the specifics of how industries have functioned, now function, and will function in the years to come. The book provides a broad overview of computing's and telecommunications' role in the entire public sector, including federal, state, and local governments, and in K-12 and higher education. Beginning in 1950, when commercial applications of digital technology began to appear, the book examines the unique ways different public Item type: chapter This chapter discusses the deployment and use of information technology in state, county, and local governments. Public sector managers and users enjoyed the same benefits and similar challenges in using the digital hand as those in many industries. They also avoided many of the difficulties faced by very large users of IT in the federal government, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike their federal colleagues, local government officials had either newer systems that were not in need of replacement too soon or they were small enough for them to find the necessary wherewithal and technical staff to keep systems up to date. In the case of small state, county, and municipal governments, the reason lay elsewhere -they just had not yet integrated computers into the core work of their departments. When these smaller agencies computerized their work systems, they did it on more modern systems, often using software designed by vendors for specific applications in public administration, or shared services put together by local governments more experienced in these matters, such as by state agencies or very large counties and cities. This chapter compares the administrative costs of public sector defined benefit and defined contribution systems offered by the federal government and many states. Administrative expenses are presented as percentages of both income and assets, and the author discusses how administrative expenses might enter into the decision by a public sector employer as to whether to establish a defined contribution plan. This book offers a shocking perspective on the American aviation industry by a former United Airlines pilot. Weaving insider knowledge with hundreds of employee interviews, the book uncovers the story airline executives and government regulators would rather not tell. While the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) claims that this is the "Golden Age of Safety," and other aviation researchers assure us the chance of dying in an airline accident is infinitesimal, this book reports that seventy percent of commercial pilots believe a major airline accident will happen soon. Who should we believe? As one captain explained, "Everybody wants their $99 ticket," but "you don't get [Captain] Sully for ninetynine bucks." Drawing parallels between the 2008 financial industry implosion and the post-9/11 airline industry, the book explains how aviation industry risk management processes have not kept pace with a rapidly changing environment. To stay safe the system increasingly relies on the experience and professionalism of airline employees who are already stressed, fatigued, and working more while earning less. For reasons discussed in the book, employees' issues do not concern the right people-namely airline executives, aviation industry regulators, politicians, watchdog groups, or even the flying public-in the right way often enough. In contrast to popular notions that airline accidents are a thing of the past, the book makes clear that America is entering a period of unprecedented aviation risk. During the postwar era, para-public institutions were used to loosen the ties that binded the state to organized interests, and to create disharmony in the social policy field by making it subject to economic and political competition. These changes were driven by tightening resource constraints, with a larger share of the federal budget being consumed by subsidies to social security when increases in the contribution rates become no longer productive for the economy and no longer politically viable. Corporatist sharing and the delegation of control over the postwar welfare state in Germany ended when governing bodies and other political parties could not control social policy and how this crowded out other political concerns. This chapter discusses what happened to public finance, specifically the fiscal crisis, in Germany during the postwar era. This chapter is about the publicly held companies in the USA. Ever since independence the states have fought to limit the role of the Federal government. Wherever a company operates it may choose any state in which to incorporate, and the states compete for its business. The recent reforms led by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) apply directly only to them and their audit firms. The chief, but not all-powerful, machine for exerting Federal pressure is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that regulates many of the processes affecting companies, shareholders, and the market, and the traffic between them. The New York Stock Exchange is the dominant institution in the stock market. Meanwhile, control of a US company can pass by replacing enough of the board through the proxy process, but the usual route is by acquiring a majority of the votes through a tender offer. This chapter examines the economic history of Baden-Württemberg. Baden-Württemberg has a well-earned reputation as one of Europe's most successful regional economies. This reputation has been built on technical excellence and quality products in key engineering such as printing machinery. The first area of focus is on the regional governance of the Land, principally its relationship with the federal level of government. This chapter also explores the changes in corporate organization, consequent upon the discovery by German business of the need for serious restructuring. The role of intermediary organizations in the animation of the regional production system is also examined as a prelude to considering the implications, both objectively and in terms expressed by official commissions and the like, regarding the future of Baden-Württemberg's historically dominant regional engineering economy, in the face of global competitive pressures. This chapter examines safety issues, centered on inefficient air traffic control systems, and antiquated regulations that continue to plague the U.S. airline industry. It first provides a historical background on commercial jet service in the United States that dramatically altered the aviation industry. It then considers the establishment of three federal agencies with aviation regulatory oversight: the Federal Aviation Administration, whose duty is to promote and regulate aviation while monitoring airline safety; the National Transportation Safety Board, in charge of investigating airline accidents; and the Civil Aeronautics Board, which supervises all aspects of airline operations from flight scheduling to fiscal management. It also explains how the U.S. government got so deeply intertwined in the day-to-day business of airline operations in the post-World War II period. It suggests that the cutthroat competition between airlines in the early days of industry development was largely instigated by the character and personalities of airline executives of the time.
This chapter surveys the political views of the top one percent of the population, the top one percent of the top one percent, and the top one percent of the top one percent of the top one percent. The higher people are in the income distribution, the more they want taxes to be low and the federal debt to be reduced. The richer they are, the less they favor income redistribution, education, infrastructure investment and universal health care. They may like some policies in the abstract, but they do not support these policies if they require increased taxes or deficit. The Koch brothers formed a secret organization, the Kochtopus, after the Powell Memo to support the political aims of the very rich. This chapter describes how we can apply service and selflessness to our secular organizations and even our personal lives with equally explosive results by making sure we have a high, overarching mission worthy of being served. It begins by focusing on the Winston-Salem, North Carolina-based Truliant Federal Credit Union and how its mission has dramatically enhanced the company's bottom line. The chapter shows that service and selflessness works not only for the Trappist monks of Mepkin Abbey but also for secular organizations like Truliant. It explains why so many corporate mission statements seem vague and irrelevant and fail to inspire, and how a radical reorientation of priorities contributes to monastic business success. The chapter also looks at the Trappist monastery of Gethsemani in Kentucky and examines Mepkin Abbey's overall mission through the concept of a membrane. Finally, the chapter considers entrepreneurship as a way to create goat-rodeo opportunities for personal growth in real time under the pressure of reallife challenges.
Mission
This chapter first explains how federal government bailouts during the subprime crisis increased the risk for more severe financial crises in the future. The government sent businesses the wrong message that they can pursue senseless strategies in search of higher yields because Uncle Sam will absorb any losses if firms are too big to fail. In other words, the result of the bailouts was moral hazard. The chapter then discusses three ways to rein in too-big-to-fail firms and evaluates the capacity of the Dodd-Frank Act to perform these tasks. First, the law should require federal regulators to put failing financial giants into receivership before stabilizing them with federal aid. Second, the nation needs a systemic risk regulator to track and address looming systemic risks. Finally, swaps need to be moved onto exchanges as much as possible, while swaps that bet on the performance of assets owned by others should be banned. Although structural financial reform for the USA came in the guise of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, it had not been implemented by the summer of 1914. Thus the outbreak of the First World War offered a window on the history of the US securities markets, exposing the limits of their development until then. On 31 July 1914, the governors of the NYSE were concerned about these markets' capacity to withstand the crisis and decided to close the exchange. However, they need not have worried so much given what the future had in store. When normal peacetime conditions returned after the crisis of 1920-1, it was clear that the war had opened the door to a new future for US securities markets. From that point on, for good or for ill, broad and deep securities markets constituted an integral part of the institutional framework that sustained US capitalism. The subprime crisis shook the American economy to its core. How did it happen? Where was the government? Did anyone see the crisis coming? Will the new financial reforms avoid a repeat performance? This book answers these questions as it tells the story behind the subprime crisis. The book offers a reasoned account of the actions that produced the greatest economic collapse since the Great Depression. The book reveals how consumer abuses in a once obscure corner of the home mortgage market led to the near meltdown of the world's financial system. The book also delves into the roles of federal banking and securities regulators, who knew of lenders' hazardous mortgages and of Wall Street's addiction to high stakes financing, but did nothing until the crisis erupted. Until recently, it was widely believed that central banks must protect people from their own worst instincts: the populace demands easy money and low interest rates, and a politically sensitive representative class will give it to them. Central banks have the responsibility of resolving this time inconsistency problem by protecting the long-term value of the currency even against the short term demands of politics. Yet the financial crisis of 2008 and the 2016 election have changed this narrative. This chapter explores how this new political economy of central banking, in the face of long-term low interest rates, changes the posture of central banks against the rest of the polity. It discusses some history of political pressures against central banks in other climates and makes predictions about how the 'new normal' of lower interest rates will challenge the Fed's ability to stay above the political fray, despite its best intentions. This chapter discusses the Federal Reserve Board's enforcement actions during the housing bubble. It describes Fed chairman Alan Greenspan's aversion to regulation and the distinct ideological imprint he put on the Fed, which was most evident in mortgage lending. It also covers the Fed's power to regulate reckless mortgages; the Truth in Lending Act disclosures, the main form of mortgage regulation at the Fed; supervision of lending institutions by the Fed; and other Fed enforcement actions affecting mortgage lending.
